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Since 1994, the German banking market is confronted with an entry wave of direct banks. 
This banking innovation may be explained by developments on the supply side as well as on 
the demand side. It is pushed by developments in telecommunication technologies during a 
period of rising cost competition and pulled by a change in the demand for selling efforts by 
banks. Within a model of monopolistic competition with endogenous selling efforts we show 
that in the long run, a direct banking market supports a larger number of firms which offer 
their products at lower prices than a branch banking market. If customers are heterogeneous, 
both banking types will survive. 
1. Introduction 
Direct banking is an innovation concerning the place of sale or the distribution channel of 
banking products. They are no longer channelled through a branch network, but through 
telecommunication (fax, telephone, personal computer) and mail. Branch banks which just ad 
phonebanking to their traditional distribution channel are not considered as direct banks 
(Pischulti 1995, p. 4). The products sold by direct banks are mainly standardized retail 
services which are not advisory in nature. They range from financial investments (e.g. savings 
certificates, time deposit accounts, stock exchange brokerage) to loan transactions (e.g. 
consumer credits) and payment transactions (e.g. current account, credit card).  
In the United States, direct banking is common in the brokerage business since 1975
1 , but is 
still in its infancy in other retail banking services (Schütt 1995, N.N. 1996i). From the 
beginning of the 1990s, European banking markets are affected by the innovation, too, with 
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the pioneer First Direct in the United Kingdom (see Kinahan 1995). Although in Germany, 
the first direct banks
2 were founded as early as in the 1960s, the innovation takes place on a 
large scale only since 1994.
3 In this year, the Santander Direct Bank entered the German 
market and the Direkt Anlage Bank and ConSors were founded as the first German imitations 
of the U.S. discount brokers. Since then, there is a wave of followers entering as subsidiaries 
of German banks, where more and more direct banks offer a broad scope of financial services 
beyond the discount brokerage (see N.N. 1996c, Lasch/Röder 1995, Hübner 1996). 
Although direct banks have gained much attention in the public and in banking journals (e.g. 
Lasch/Röder 1995, Schütt 1995, Pischulti 1996), they have hardly been discussed from a 
theoretical point of view. To our knowledge, only phonebanking has been analyzed 
theoretically by Bouckaert and Degryse (1995). In a model of spatial competition in the 
market for deposits they show that offering phonebanking creates two opposing effects. By 
lowering transaction costs, it induces an increase in demand, but also tougher competition. 
The competitive effects cause a tendency to underinvest in phonebanking.  
In the present paper, we try to explain direct banking by adopting a broader approach: the 
distribution channel may be any type of telecommunication and the product may be any type 
of a standardized financial service which can be sold without a branch bank. On the demand 
side, we introduce heterogeneity of the banks' customers in terms of their need of selling 
efforts by branch banks. On the supply side, we consider a reduction in processing costs 
which increases the attractiveness of founding a direct bank. Bouckaert and Degryse (1995) 
view phonebanking  as a technological innovation brought about by a reduction in the 
transaction costs on the demand side. They argue that it makes depositors more willing to 
accept lower deposit rates (Bouckaert/Degryse 1995, p. 230). In reality, however, the services 
of direct banks are offered at lower prices, e.g. higher deposit rates, than the services of 
branch banks. This points to a reduction in the processing costs which is passed through to the 
market price. Direct banking may then be viewed as a technology push and a demand pull 
innovation. As a technology push innovation, it would be the reaction to an exogenous 
increase of knowledge about lower cost distribution channels and as a demand pull innovation 
it would be the reaction to an increased preference of customers for impersonal selling 
efforts.
4
To analyze the incentives to introduce this innovation, we consider that the demand for 
selling efforts by a bank arises from their provision of information to buyers, as has been 
shown for the demand for advertising by Ehrlich and Fisher (1982). Selling efforts by banks 
may affect the demand for financial services because they lower the gap between the market 
price received by a bank and the full price borne by its customer. This gap exists because of 
the buyer's cost of obtaining information about varieties of financial products, transaction 
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costs and adjustment costs in the case of disappointing purchases. It induces a demand for 
cost-saving information or selling efforts by the seller (Ehrlich/Fisher 1982, p. 366). 
Alternatively, the production of information may be brought about by the buyers themselves. 
If in the case of a financial product there is a perfect substitutability between selling efforts by 
a branch bank and search for information by a buyer, this product may be sold directly, 
without a personal contact in a branch bank. We argue that this applies to the standardized 
products of direct banks which use a different technology to provide the necessary selling 
efforts. We examine the demand, the supply and the pricing of those products along the lines 
of Ehrlich and Fisher (1982). 
In chapter 2, we analyze the demand for selling efforts as provided by branch banks in order 
to find out which group of customers would profit from direct banking. In chapter 3, we 
examine the effects of direct banking within the model of monopolistic competition. 
Departing from the long-run equilibrium of branch banking (3.1), we discuss the short-run 
profits obtainable by the direct banking pioneer and the resulting long-run equilibrium (3.2). 
Then, the effects of the innovation on the equilibrium selling efforts and market price are 
examined more closely (3.3). Finally, in chapter 4, we draw conclusions and confront the 
hypotheses with empirical evidence. 
2.  Demand for Selling Efforts by Branch Banks 
We consider a set of heterogeneous financial products which are offered by different branch 
banks and are close substitutes in consumption. Let p  be the nominal price received by a 
bank for the provision of a financial service of variety i. It may represent the fee for a security 
transaction, a custodian fee, a deposit rate reduction or a loan rate premium vis-à-vis the 
market interest rate. A buyer of the service pays this price plus transaction and information 
costs which are due to shopping costs and his imperfect knowledge about the characteristics 
of product varieties offered by the different banks. Following Ehrlich and Fisher (1982, S. 
368), we assume that these costs consist in the foregone value of time which the buyer 
expects to spend to realize the desired transactions. If l denotes the expected length of time 
spent per unit good and w represents the buyer's opportunity cost of time, the full price of 
variety i borne by buyer j is given by 
i
πij pw l ij =+ i j  (1) 
Let l be a decreasing and convex function of the following variables: 
l l (E ,A,K ,x ) ij ij i i ij ij =  (2) 
The first two variables represent information-producing activities by the bank i in the form of 
selling efforts Ei within a branch  (e.g. personal advice about an investment in securities or 
deposits) and media advertising Ai. The variable Kij denotes the knowledge about the financial 
service  i acquired by the customer j from all other sources (e.g. education, experience, 
search). It may also include the knowledge about a special telecommunication technology to   5
obtain product i directly. Finally, a reduction in the length of time l spent per unit product 
may be brought about by an increase in the number Xij of the product i purchased by customer 
j.  
The demand for branch bank i's selling efforts   depends on their relative efficiency of 
reducing information and transaction costs and on their substitutability vis-à-vis the 
alternative information-producing or cost-reducing activities. To derive further determinants 
of this demand, we consider the decision of a buyer to minimize the information and 
transaction costs of the financial product by purposive search for knowledge. It is an optimal 
investment decision, where in any period of time t knowledge may be acquired at a fixed unit 
price of time w in order to minimize the total time costs of acquiring the financial product. If 














=− δ , (4) 
where r denotes a fixed discount rate, I(t) (Ι(t) > 0) is the investment in knowledge done in 
period t in units of search time, K(t) is the accumulated stock of knowledge in period t which 
negatively affects the shopping time l in that period. K accumulates over time with the rate 
K dK dt
•
= : / , depreciating at the fixed rate δ per unit time. The number of purchases x is 
assumed to remain constant over time.
5 If I(t) > 0 in any period, we obtain
6 as condition for a 
cost minimum 
[] − xwl K* (t),E(t),A(t),x(t) w(r K δ ) = +
                                                
, (5) 
where  lK denotes the first partial derivative of l with respect to K. It is necessary and 
sufficient, because l has been assumed to be convex in K, lKK (K*) > 0. Equation (5) indicates 
that an optimal stock of knowledge K* in any period t is reached if the marginal return given 
by the reduction in shopping costs (net of the costs of purposive search) equals the marginal 
costs of knowledge accumulation (Ehrlich/Fisher 1982, pp. 368).  
The optimal stock of knowledge depends positively on the scale of purchases x and on the 
buyer's search efficiency lK, whereas it depends negatively on the discount rate r and the 
depreciation rate δ. It is independent of the opportunity cost of time w which raises the 
marginal cost of knowledge accumulation in the same way as its marginal benefits. 
Nevertheless, the optimal stock of knowledge should be positively affected by an increase in 
the buyer's income (wage or nonwage), which allows a larger scale of purchases. Buyers with 
a higher level of education should have more incentives to invest in knowledge, because their 
 
5  For simplicity, we drop the indices i and j for the bank i and its customer j. 
6  The problem may be solved by the Maximum principle of optimal control (see e.g. Chiang 1992).   6
search productivity is likely to be higher. They may not only have a comparative advantage in 
obtaining knowledge about special financial services, but also in learning to use more 
complex telecommunication channels such as the personal computer. Finally, we expect that 
younger people are more willing to invest in knowledge than older people. Since they are 
more acquainted with modern methods of telecommunication, their productivity of providing 
the necessary investments is likely to be higher. 
What are the implications for the demand for personal selling efforts by a branch bank? Let us 
assume that  , which indicates that E and K are substitutes. The 
efficiency of reducing information and transaction costs by selling efforts E is reduced by an 
increase in the stock of knowledge K. Hence, the demand for selling efforts by branch 
banking should be the lower, the more knowledge the buyer has accumulated by purposive 
search. It should be lowest for young persons with high income and a high level of education. 
l:  l /E K0 EK
2 = ∂∂ ∂ >
                                                
3.  Monopolistic Competition with Selling Efforts  
3.1.  The Case of Branch Banking 
As to the supply side, we consider a market for a banking service which is characterized by 
monopolistic competition. There is a large number of banks, each offering a different product 
variety or brand.
7 The brands are close substitutes in consumption. Initially we assume that 
the buyers may differ with respect to personal preferences for different varieties, but not to 
their opportunities to acquire the product. The average cost curves of established and potential 
banks are identical and decreasing or U-shaped. We differentiate between production costs 
which accrue in the back office and costs of selling efforts in the front office. The production 
costs comprise variable processing costs and fixed costs which are mainly due to investments 
in a data processing system and advertising expenses to send messages to customers and 
create a brand. In the case of branch banking, the costs of selling efforts are to a large degree 
fixed. They consist in the costs of the branch network such as rents for the buildings, costs of 
transporting the transfer slips and labor costs. In the traditional branch banking system the 
latter are high, because the sales personnel must be qualified not only to transact services, but 
also to give personal advice to uninformed customers. Since for a given branch network these 
selling efforts are independent of the scale of output, we assume that their costs are fixed. 
Then, the total costs may be expressed by 
T(x,E) = C(x) + eE, (6) 
where C(x) are the production costs, x is the scale of output and E are selling efforts with 
constant costs e per unit (e.g. per branch). We focus on selling efforts as a  means of banks to 
 
7  The creation of brands is especially relevant for service industries, where image and trustworthiness of the 
suppliers are important for demand (see De Bandt 1996, p. 20). In banking markets, an image is usually not 
directed to the products, but to the suppliers who seek to create consumer preferences in this way (Sondhof 
1989, pp. 108).   7
reduce the information costs or transaction costs of buyers. Advertising as another means to 
reduce these costs primarily serves to inform potential customers about the innovation of 
direct banking, differentiating it from branch banking products and brands.
8
Although each bank is a kind of natural monopoly in its brand, it must take the prices of its 
rivals as given. In the market equilibrium, they are determined by the level of zero profits. If 
the seller of brand i charged a market price above the equilibrium level, it would risk losing 
its customers to a competing bank which could enter the market by offering a substitute. In 
the same way, the competitive level of the full  price is determined by the zero profit 
condition. Hence, a bank cannot charge a market price that exceeds its average costs or a 
price differential for selling efforts that exceeds the indirect cost saving to customers 
(Ehrlich/Fisher 1982, pp. 370). 
If all banks face the same demand function, the market equilibrium with branch banking is 
characterized by Chamberlin's tangency solution of a representative bank i which maximizes 
its profit by equating marginal revenue and marginal costs (see Chamberlin 1933). This 
equilibrium is shown for the case of linear demand in figure 1.
9 The line D represents the 
demand curve for brand i with market price pi, if all other banks hold their market prices 
constant. Because of incomplete information and transaction costs on the demand side, its 
location depends on the selling efforts of branch banking Eb. It shifts in parallel to the right, if 
the full price πi  is reduced by selling efforts. Simultaneously, the increase in the selling 
efforts leads to a vertical shift in the bank's average cost schedule AC and hence to an 
increase in the market price.  The long-run equilibrium Lb with selling efforts   is reached 
when the full price of the brand can no longer be reduced by an increment in selling efforts 
(Ehrlich/Fisher 1982, p. 373). It depends on the properties of the full price demand function 
and the average cost function. The higher ceteris paribus the full price elasticity of demand at 
a low level of selling efforts ( , the more pronounced is the shift in the conventional 
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8  For the case of telephone banking in the U.S.A. it has been shown that advertising in the initial periods of the 
innovation accelerated its diffusion, but was gradually reduced as the product moved through its life cycle 
(Horsky/Simon 1983). 
9  For simplicity, the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves are not drawn in figure 1. 
10 See Ehrlich and Fisher (1982, p. 373), who, however, take the number of brands offered as determined, 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium selling efforts and sales of a representative branch bank  
 
3.2.  The Innovation of Direct Banking 
Direct banking is a new technology of selling efforts by banks. The personal contact between 
the sales personnel and customers in a large number of branches is replaced by impersonal 
mail or telecommunication between a single banking office and the customers. Hence, the 
high capital and wage costs of the branch network are substituted by lower costs. The 
building expenses are lower, because the bank must not be located in a densely populated area 
to be close to the customers and the wage costs are lower due to both a reduction in the 
volume and the wage rate of the staff. Direct banking does not need financial experts who 
give advice about the products sold, but rather sales personnel who just receive and transact 
orders by way of mail or telecommunication. The cost savings are mainly due to a decrease in 
fixed costs. Moreover, the costs of the selling efforts should become more variable. In 
Germany, branch banks cannot react flexibly to changes in demand. Wages and labor 
capacities are fixed by umbrella agreements and capacities cannot be shifted between 
different branches. If, however, a direct bank is established out of a parent bank („stand-alone 
solution“), it is not tied to the strict rules of the umbrella agreements.  It can obtain labor up to 
20% cheaper and at more flexible working hours (Steltzner 1996).  
We assume that the production costs in the back office are the same for branch banking and 
direct banking. Directs banks, too, need a data processing system for providing their services 
and advertising expenses to create their brands. Although these expenses should be higher 
when the innovation is introduced, we expect that in the long run they are not significantly 
different from those of the traditional branch banks. 
The innovation of direct banking could be introduced by a new entrant which offers a 
substitute to the products sold or by an established bank which offers its old brand with the 
new sales technology. If both depart from the zero profit equilibrium, their incentives to reap 
profits by the innovation should be the same. However, profits can arise only temporarily, 
since the technology of direct banking is not patentable. This reduces the incentive to   9
innovate. The expectation of temporary profits may be driven by an expected cost reduction 
and by an expected exogenous increase in demand. In the first case, we speak of a technology 
push innovation, in the second case of a demand pull innovation. To examine both incentives, 
let us depart from the long-run branch banking equilibrium Lb in figure 2 and assume that 
bank i substitutes the direct banking technology for the branch banking technology. Figure 2 
shows two effects. On the supply side, the average cost curve shifts downward and becomes 
flatter if the selling efforts of branch banking   are replaced by low selling efforts of direct 
banking  . On the demand side, the change of the sales technology leads to a shift in the 
demand function, depending on the relative efficiency of both technologies to reduce the full 
price. If we maintain the assumption that all customers are homogeneous with respect to their 
opportunities to acquire the product, there is a latent demand for direct banking if the buyers 
have accumulated the knowledge which makes the new technology superior to the old one. If 
this is the case, the introduction of direct banking leads to a rightward shift in the demand 
function and a corresponding shift in the average cost function, as long as the full price can be 
reduced by an increment in selling efforts of direct banking more than it was reduced before 
by branch banking. The shift in the demand function of bank i is the higher, the higher the full 
price elasticity of demand when the innovation is introduced. It is highest if all customers of 
the competitors are attracted by the reduction in the full price of brand i at given full prices of 
the other brands. In this case, the rival banks would be driven out of the market. In figure 2, 
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Figure 2:  Short run and long run effects of direct banking 
We see that there are two incentives to innovate which cannot be isolated from each other. 
Bank i obtains positive profits by a cost reduction accompanied by an increase in demand.
11 If 
                                                  
11 The profits could be illustrated in figure 2 by drawing the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves which 
have been omitted for simplicity. Each bank is maximizing profit such that marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue along the individual demand curve D. The volume of profits is determined by the difference between 
the price on the short-run demand curve   and the average cost on the short-run cost curve at the  D(Ed
s )  10
there was no latent demand for direct banking, the demand curve would shift to the left as the 
personal selling efforts by branches are reduced to zero. The innovation would not be 
accepted, since the increase in the full price would induce the customers to buy substitutes 
from branch banks. 
If there are no entry barriers and all banks have equal access to the new technology, the 
profits of bank i will induce the adoption of direct banking by rivals and new banks which 
enter the market by offering new brands. The increase in the number of competitors leads to a 
parallel downward shift in the demand curve of bank i, which is a representative bank again, 
if all rivals have adopted the new technology (see e.g. Neumann 1994, pp. 200). A new long 
run equilibrium is reached at the point of zero profits, where the average cost curve  AC E  ( d ) ∗
 
and the demand curve of bank i   are again tangent, as illustrated by point Ld in figure 
2. If we compare this long-run equilibrium of competition between direct banks to the long-
run equilibrium of competition between branch banks, we see that the output of a single bank 
is lower and hence the number of viable banks larger in the case of direct banking. This is 
caused by two effects: a reduction in fixed costs and an increase in demand by more efficient 
selling efforts.12 Hence, the direct banking equilibrium is more competitive than the branch 
banking equilibrium. This could cause an underinvestment in direct banking, if the 
equilibrium number of branch banks was low enough to enable collusion. In this case, the 
branch banks would maximize their joint profits along the market demand curve and obtain 
profits, which they would lose by switching to direct banking.13 This result supports the 
finding of Bouckaert and Degryse (1995) that there is a tendency to underinvest in 
phonebanking because of increasing competition, which they have derived for an exogenous 




On the other hand, it may be advantageous to be the first mover of direct banking, because the 
pioneer can reap the largest profits by attracting the customers from rival banks. The incentive 
to innovate should be the higher, the Lower are the expected Losses due to 'cannibalization' of 
own customers in branch banking and the higher are the expectations that direct banking is 
introduced by rivals. Hence, although direct banking is not profitable in the long run, it may 
pay to move first in order to reap short-run profits and prevent losses from the switching of 
customers to rivals banks. 










optimal output level. The short-run cost curve   lies somewhere between   and  , 
when the short-run equilibrium level of selling efforts E  is reached. 
12 This does not mean that the volume of selling efforts is larger in the case of direct banking, because selling 
efforts are substituted by the buyers' search for information (see chapter 3.3).  
13 This collusive equilibrium could be illustrated in figure 1 by drawing the market demand curve for brand i if 
all banks match price changes. It is steeper than the individual demand curve where only bank i changes its 
price. The banks would maximize profits by equating marginal cost to the marginal revenue derived from the 
market demand curve, which leads to a lower equilibrium output and a higher price (see Neumann 1994, p. 
201).   11
We have assumed that the production costs in the back office do not differ in the long run. If, 
however, the introduction of direct banking requires higher expenses in advertising and a data 
processing technology, the temporary profits as an incentive to innovate are reduced.  
If we drop the assumption that buyers are homogeneous with respect to their shopping 
opportunities, we can differentiate between two customer groups. The first group comprises 
all 'traditional' buyers who need personal contact and advice in a branch bank. The second 
group contains all those buyers who have accumulated enough knowledge to profit from 
impersonal transactions. The incentive to introduce direct banking should increase with the 
expected customer share of the second group. If it is high enough, the two customer groups 
will be separated in a branch banking equilibrium and a direct banking equilibrium. It may go 
along with a separation of the sellers, too. As has been mentioned above, in Germany the 
stand-alone solution to direct banking permits lower and more flexible labor costs.  Moreover, 
a separation may be necessary to create different images by different advertising messages or 
to establish a lower-cost information system (Krupp 1996, p. 713). Actually, the new direct 
banks in Germany have been founded by traditional banks as separate, independent entities 
with a different name. They may, however, profit from their relation to a parent branch bank, 
which could have accumulated reputation for safety and which could share some investments 
with the direct bank (e.g. automatic teller machines). 
3.3. Equilibrium Selling Efforts and Market Price 
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrated the equilibrium values of output and market price under the 
assumption of optimal selling efforts which minimize the information and transaction costs on 
the demand side. To gain further insight into the effects of direct banking on selling efforts 
and market price, let us derive the optimum values of these variables from the maximization 
of a representative bank's profit function. The problem may be formulated as follows 
{} Max N(E,p) px C(x) eE
E =− − (7) 
subject to the equilibrium conditions 
N = 0  (8) 
x D(p*,E* == φ π (* ) )  (9) 
d * 0 p (E*) wl (E*) EE π == +  (10) 
(see Ehrlich/Fisher 1982, p. 373). Equation (8) is the zero profit condition. Equation (9) states 
that in equilibrium demand depends on the full price which is a function of the market price 
and selling efforts. Equation (10) requires that the equilibrium full price cannot be reduced 
through more selling efforts. The necessary conditions of profit maximization subject to 
equations (8) and (9) yield a "supply-side" equilibrium schedule in p and E (denoted by S), 
whereas equation (10) yields a "demand-side" equilibrium schedule in p and E (denoted by 
F). The equilibrium values of p and E are determined by the point of tangency of both curves   12
e
x
wlE =−  (11) 
The left hand side of equation (11) describes the slope of the S-schedule at the full price 
minimum and the right hand side the slope of the F-schedule. The S-schedule is at least 
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Figure 3: Selling efforts and market price for branch banking and direct banking 
In figure 3, the equilibrium market price and selling efforts in the case of branch banking are 
determined by the point Qb. The slope of the S(Eb)-curve is high because of high costs of 
selling efforts e. The slope of the F(Eb)-schedule is high for customers in need of personal 
selling efforts, for whom the productivity of selling efforts 
lEb  is high. For customers who do 
not demand personal selling efforts because they have accumulated the relevant knowledge, 
the slope of the F(Eb)-schedule would be lower. However, they cannot move down along the 
S(Eb)-curve because they have to pay the same market price as the other customers and 
because they still have to go to a branch to acquire a financial product. If direct banking is 
introduced, the S-schedule becomes flatter due to lower fixed costs of selling efforts e. It 
would get linear at the point of tangency with the F-curve, if the selling costs became totally 
variable with respect to output x.14 Simultaneously, the F-schedule will become flatter, since 
for the informed customers, the productivity of selling efforts to reduce the information costs 
is lower. In figure 3, the direct banking equilibrium Qd implies a lower level of market price 
and selling efforts than the branch banking equilibrium.  
The actual change of market price, however, depends on the properties of the cost and 
demand functions and on the simultaneous change in output x. Let us consider only a 
reduction in e brought about by direct banking. Given the cost function (6), the equilibrium 
price is given by 
                                                  






































The first term on the right hand side indicates the price reduction brought about by an induced 
increase in demand, ∂ ∂ xe /  < 0. It is the higher, the higher is the price elasticity of the full 
demand curve, the higher are the fixed costs of production (causing a higher differential 
between average costs Cx and marginal costs C') and the higher are the fixed costs e of 
selling efforts. The second term describes the price reduction caused by the lower selling 
costs at given output. The third term indicates a price increase by an expansion of the optimal 
selling effort along the unchanged demand schedule F. In the case of direct banking, however, 
the reduction in e goes along with a change in the demand schedule due to a substitution of 
selling efforts E by the customers' production of knowledge K. If this substitution effect 
dominates the expansion effect ∂ ∂ E / e , the market price is reduced unambiguously. 
4.  Conclusions and Evidence 
We conclude that direct banking is the result of two interactive developments, technological 
progress in communication technologies and an exogenous change in demand for personal 
selling efforts by banks. The incentive to introduce this innovation depends on the expected 
cost reduction, the expected demand for direct banking and the expected change in the 
intensity of competition in the banking market. Under the assumption of monopolistic 
competition, the market for direct banking should support a larger number of firms with a 
lower market price than the branch banking market in the long run. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of collusion, there is an incentive for a branch bank to establish a direct bank early, in 
order to reap short run profits and prevent a loss of market share by the switching of 
customers to earlier movers. This does not imply that branch banking is obsolete in the long 
run. Direct banking is no alternative for uninformed customers and customers who prefer the 
personal contact in a branch bank. As long as customers are heterogeneous, the banking 
market supports two separating equilibria. 
The results are confirmed by the events in the US stock brokerage market after regulatory 
constraints on commissions had been relaxed in 1975: "Discount firms have thus entered and 
been financially successful, but even though their rates are less than half those of the full-
service brokers, they have not in any sense taken over the market from the full-line firms. 
Both groups have prospered" (Bailey 1986, p.10). 
In chapter 2, we concluded that the customers should be segmented according to age, income 
and level of education. Indeed, the customers of direct banks tend to be younger, wealthier 
and more highly educated than branch banking customers (Pischulti 1995, p. 7, Hübner 1996,   14
p. 15).  For example, the German direct bank Bank 24 reports that 70% of its customers are of 
age between beginning of 30 and end of 40, have a net income of household amounting to at 
least 4000 DM/month and are self-employed or professional workers. More than 80% own a 
personal computer, compared to only 18% of the whole population (Drosten 1996, p. 60, 
Krupp 1996, p. 713). German bank customers have become more emancipated in the last 
decade, being less loyal towards their traditional house banks, more price-sensitive and 
tending more towards a do-it-yourself mentality (Morschhäuser 1995, p.24). Dahlhausen and 
Siebald (1995, p.31) suggest a segmentation of customers in the discount brokerage business 
according to sociodemographic and psychological features and to features of investment 
behavior (see table 1). 
 
Sociodemographic features  Psychological features  Investment behavior 
age:  
•  25 - 40 years 
profession: 
•  executive employees/public 
officials 
•  other salaried employees/ 
public officials 
•  professionals 
•  self-employed 
net income (per month): 
•  household: ≥ 5000 DM 
•  person: ≥ 3000 DM 
volume of securities account:  
•  > 30000 DM (per year) 
•  open-minded towards 
new communication 
technologies 
•  own initiative 
•  willingness to learn 
•  high turnover rate 
•  high market knowledge  
•  high product knowledge 
•  comparison of offers 
•  low bank loyalty 
•  preference for security 
investments  
Table 1: Criteria for customer segmentation in discount brokerage 
In 1996, about a million people use a direct bank in Germany, which corresponds to  a market 
share of 1% in the retail banking market (Raab 1996, Krupp 1996). Most of the Germans still 
wish to be adviced personally when acquiring financial services. They fear that the 
channelling of financial services by telecommunication is less safe than by personal contact 
(N.N. 1995b). Nevertheless, the German direct banking market is growing. To increase their 
attractiveness for less informed customers, some direct banks provide informations about the 
stock exchange (e.g. ConSors) or even investment advice (Advance Bank) by way of 
telecommunication (Prandl 1996, N.N. 1996d). In the discount brokerage business, most of 
the orders are already sent by PC (N.N. 1996a). The number of potential direct banking 
customers in Germany is estimated to reach 10 millions and in the longer run 15 millions   15
(N.N. 1996f). Market experts expect that in 10 to 15 years 20% of customers will carry out 
about 80% of their banking transactions by computer (Steltzner 1996). 
The main motive to use a direct bank are lower prices or higher deposit rates (N.N. 1995b). 
On average, direct banks offer their services at fees 40-50% below the fees of the traditional 
branch banks (Lasch/Röder 1995, p. 342). The price advantage of discount brokers as 
compared to full brokers is even 50-90% (Studer 1995, N.N. 1996d). The low prices are due 
to the low costs of direct banking. In the United States, the transaction of a standardizable 
banking product costs 1.07 US$ when carried out in a branch bank, 0.73 US$ when done per 
mail, 0.35 US$ when done per phone and only 0.27 US$ when carried out at a self-service 
terminal (Morschhäuser 1995, p. 22).  
In Germany, the comparative cost advantage of direct banks vis-à-vis branch banks is obvious 
from a comparison of the ratio of the staff costs and other administrative costs to the business 
volume. This is shown in tables 2 and 3, where we differentiate between three groups of 
branch banks (large private banks, savings banks, credit co-operatives) and the three oldest 
direct banks in Germany. 
 





























Table 2:   Staff costs of branch banks and direct banks in percent of business volume
13 





























Table 3:  Other administrative expense of branch banks and direct banks in percent of 
business volume
15
For German banks, there has been no pressure to reduce costs by the innovation of direct 
banking until the 1990s. The German retail banking market was characterized by presence 
competition with an enlargement of branch networks until 1980 and by quality competition 
with an improvement of customer services (especially personal advice) in the period 1980-
                                                  
15 Sources: Monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank, October 1995, August 1996; annual reports; own 
calculations.   16
1990. Since the possibilities to increase market share by improved quality have been 
exhausted, banks reduce prices (increase deposit rates) in the 1990s. Finally, the reduction of 
price-cost margins pushes the banks to reduce their costs, creating cost competition. In the 
market segment of standardizable security transactions, price and cost competition were 
introduced by the establishment of discount brokers in 1994 (Schütt 1995). 
Nevertheless, the incentive to move first is likely to be low because of the non-patentability of 
the innovation. Moreover, by adopting a follower strategy a bank may profit from the 
investments of the innovator by learning or spill-over effects. If, however, the investments of 
the first mover imply sunk costs (e.g. by advertising), he could build up a permanent 
leadership position. In this case, competition in the direct banking market would be less 
intense as indicated by the model of monopolistic competition above.16 
Actually, the intensity of competition in the direct banking market is high. Since the informed 
customers of direct banks are especially price sensitive, the price elasticity of demand is high. 
To restrain it, direct banks increase the customers' switching costs by invoicing high fees on 
the transfer of a securities account to a rival bank (Lasch/Röder 1995). Competition between 
differentiated banks is higher than between a direct bank and a branch bank belonging to the 
same parent company. The new direct banks attract their customers mainly from rival banks 
and hardly from the branch banks of their parent bank (Lasch/Röder 1995, p. 342, Drosten 
1996, p.60, N.N. 1995e). However, the "cannibalization effect" seems to have increased in the 
last year (N.N. 1996b, h). 
The establishment of a direct bank requires high investments, especially in data processing 
infrastructure.17 To reach the break-even point, a direct bank needs a large growth in its 
business volume at low margins (N.N. 1996f). Hence, there is an intense competition for new 
customers which goes along with high investments in advertising to inform customers and 
differentiate products. Therefore, the costs of gaining a new customer are high
18 and it takes 
about 4-5 years, to reach the break-even point (N.N. 1995c, 1996f, Steltzner 1996). The high 
advertising expenses of the new direct banks do not seem to harm the pioneers. The 
Allgemeine Deutsche Direktbank, which exists since 1965, reports that to the contrary, it 
profits from those investments, without having to increase its own advertising expenditures 
(N.N. 1995d). The Quelle Bank, which also has been founded before the beginning of the 
direct banking boom, still profits from its advantage to belong to a retail establishment 
providing a large customer base (Steltzner 1996). However, the pioneer of discount broking in 
                                                  
16 The implications for market structure can be derived from a two-stage game, where a bank can enhance the 
demand for its products at stage 2 by incurring greater advertising outlays at stage 1. Then, an increase in the 
size of the market cannot lead to a fragmented market structure, because competition between incumbent 
banks raises the equilibrium level of sunk costs at stage 1 of the game. The higher the degree of demand 
responsiveness faced by a bank to increases in its fixed advertising outlays in the first stage of the game, the 
higher will be the industry’s minimum concentration level (Sutton 1992, p.11). 
17 For the Deutsche Bank subsidiary Bank 24, these investments amounted to 40 million DM in the first year, 
which where mainly due to investments in data processing (N.N. 1995a). Market experts estimate the total 
start-up costs (without advertising expenses) to reach 100-200 million DM (Steltzner 1996). 
18 For the German market, the advertising costs in the first year are estimated to 30-40 million DM and the costs 
of attracting a new customer to 300-700 DM (Jünemann 1995, N.N. 1996f, Steltzner 1996).    17
Germany, the Direkt Anlage Bank, could not maintain its leadership position. This is obvious 
from figures 4 and 5. 
Actually, competition by the entrance of new direct banks is tougher than expected. 
Therefore, the Direkt Anlage Bank had to postpone its break-even expectation for two years 
(N.N. 1996b, h).  In view of these experiences, Jürgen Sarrazin, the chairman of the Dresdner 
Bank, is glad about not having entered the direct banking market yet: „You should lead the 
cow to the pasture only after the grass has grown“ (N.N. 1996e, p. 77). Therefore, he decided 
to erect a direct bank subsidiary of the Dresdner Bank not before the second half of the year 
1997 (N.N. 1996g). Until then, the grass should grow further and the Dresdner Bank hopes to 
feed its yet unnamed cow by offering a much broader scope of retail banking products than its 

































QB    =  Quelle Bank (since 1990)
ADD  = Allgemeine Deutsche Direktbank (since 1965)
AAB  = Augsburger Aktienbank (since 1963)
Cum. Entry = cumulative number of customers of market 
 
Figure 4:   Development of the number of customers of incumbents and market entries in the 














































Market entries:  Direkt Anlage Bank (May 1994), Consors (June 1994), Santander Direkt Bank (Sept 
1994), ComDirekt (Febr. 1995), GiroTel (July 1995), Bank 24 (Sept. 1995), Advance Bank (March 1996)
 
Figure 5:  Development of the number of customers of market entries in the German direct 
banking market since 1994
16
 
16 Sources: Annual reports; newspaper reports; own calculations.   19
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The slope and the curvature of the F-schedule are derived from the minimization of the full 
price Π which leads to the equilibrium condition (10). 











wl 0    l 0 2 EE EE =− < > since  because of the convexity of l(E,·). (A8) 
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which ensures convexity at least at this point. 